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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. ISSUE*
As a new tribunal, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia [“ECCC”] can

expect to face challenges against its own legitimacy. Specifically, the Defense is likely to
challenge the validity of the establishment of the tribunal and allege that the tribunal has not been
duly established by law. The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia [“ICTY”] addressed this challenge in the Tadic1 case. It set forth the requirements
for a tribunal to be deemed legitimate and described what elements are necessary for a court to
be “established by law.”2 This memo will examine to what extent the Extraordinary Chambers
meets those requirements.
B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. The ECCC has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction.
The Extraordinary Chambers has not only the authority to determine its own jurisdiction,
but also the duty under international law to exercise the principle of la compétence de la
compétence, or its “jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” The ECCC must address the
question of the legitimacy of its own establishment, rather than rejecting such a challenge as a
non-justiciable or political question. The Extraordinary Chambers is a groundbreaking tribunal,
and as such needs to accept that it is treading on new legal ground which must be explored. No
other hybrid tribunal has had such a high degree of association with a national judiciary.
*

The Defense is likely to challenge the legitimacy of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case set out the
requirements for a Tribunal to be deemed legitimate. Analyze the extent to which the Cambodia Tribunal meets
those requirements.
1

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Appeal] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
2

Id. at ¶ 42.

1

2. The ECCC has been established in accordance with the general principle
whereby courts must be “established by law.”
The Appeals Chamber’s decision in the Tadic case is currently the international standard
for determining the legality of the establishment of an international criminal tribunal. Although
the Extraordinary Chambers incorporates many different elements from those of the ICTY, many
of the standards that the Appeals Chamber used to judge the legitimacy of the ICTY’s
establishment can also be applied to the ECCC.
In particular, the Appeals Chamber determined that in order for a tribunal to be deemed
legitimate, it must be “established by law.”3 The Appeals Chamber then examined several
possible meanings of the term “established by law.” One meaning suggested was that the
tribunal had to be promulgated by a legislature. The Extraordinary Chambers was established by
such an act, the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea.4
Equally importantly, the Extraordinary Chambers was also established by a treaty, the
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea.5 Although this meaning of the term “established by law” was raised by the defense

3

Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, at ¶ 41 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

4

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27
October 2004 [hereinafter ECCC Law] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
5

Royal Government of Cambodia, Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea (signed 6 June 2003; promulgated 19 October 2004; entered into force 29 April 2005) [hereinafter
ECCC Agreement] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

2

in the Tadic case at trial,6 it was not thoroughly investigated by the Tadic court, due to its lack of
application to the ICTY. It was later examined by the Special Court for Sierra Leone [“SCSL”],
which was also founded by a treaty, and this method was found by the SCSL to be a legitimate
method by which to establish an international criminal tribunal.7
3. The ECCC incorporates the minimum fair trial guarantees from Article
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[“ICCPR”].
Continuing in its analysis of possible meanings of the term “established by law,” the
ICTY Appeals Chamber determined that its preferred definition of “established by law” was that
international tribunals “must be established in accordance with the proper international
standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full
conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments.”8 Ultimately, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber found that the most important factor in the determination of a tribunal’s
legitimacy was procedural fairness.9 In particular, the tribunal must provide the minimum fair
trial guarantees set forth in Article 14 of the ICCPR.
4. The legitimacy of the ECCC will ultimately depend upon whether the due
process and fair trial guarantees incorporated in the ECCC Law are
followed by the Extraordinary Chambers.
On paper, the Extraordinary Chambers meets the Tadic legitimacy requirements. It was
founded both by the Cambodian legislature and by a treaty between the United Nations and the

6

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the
International Tribunal, ¶ 2 (Aug. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Decision at Trial] [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 14].
7

Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I-059, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31,
2004) at ¶ 35 [hereinafter Taylor Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction] [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 17].
8

Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, at ¶ 45 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

9

See id.

3

Royal Government of Cambodia, and incorporates into its governing law the minimum fair trial
guarantees from Article 14 of the ICCPR. However, the Extraordinary Chambers will still face
numerous challenges to its legitimacy, stemming primarily from the fact that it has been
established in a Cambodian judicial system that, in the past, has been far from a model justice
system. The ability of the Cambodian judges to remain independent and impartial from a
government that is accustomed to interfering in court matters remains to be seen. Additionally, it
remains to be seen whether the procedures of the Extraordinary Chambers will be feasible, for
the ECCC incorporates several untested procedural methods at the international criminal level, in
particular the requirement that a supermajority of judges be required for any decision to be made.
How the Extraordinary Chambers responds to these challenges will ultimately determine whether
or not it is viewed as a legitimate tribunal.

4

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Dusko Tadic was a Bosnian Serb café owner accused of heinous crimes against Bosnian

Muslims and Croats in 1992.10 As the first person to appear before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [“ICTY”], he was indicted on February 13, 1995 for
“various violations of international humanitarian law.”11 On June 23, 1995, he filed a preliminary
motion seeking dismissal of all charges against him, alleging that the ICTY lacked jurisdiction.12
Tadic alleged that the ICTY 1) was founded illegally, 2) had wrongful primacy over national
courts, and 3) lacked subject matter jurisdiction.13 The ICTY Trial Chamber dismissed the
motions relating to primacy and subject matter jurisdiction and determined itself to be
incompetent to rule on its own establishment.14 The defense then filed an interlocutory appeal on
jurisdiction.15
The ICTY Appeals Chamber determined to hear challenges both to “the jurisdiction of
the Appeals Chamber to hear this appeal” and “the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal to
hear this case on the merits.”16 The Appeals Chamber determined that the legality and primacy

10

Aaron K. Baltes, Prosecutor v. Tadic: Legitimizing the Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 49 ME. L. REV. 577, 590 (1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
11
Id. at 591.
12

Id.

13

Tadic Decision at Trial, Case No. IT-94-1-T, [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

14

Id. at ¶ 33.

15

Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

16

Id. at ¶ 3.

5

of the Tribunal itself could be used as the basis of an interlocutory appeal,17 and therefore
continued to examine the jurisdiction of the ICTY to hear the case on the merits.18
First, the Appeals Chamber determined whether it could examine the question of its own
jurisdiction. Relying on the principle of “la competence de la compétence,”19 the Appeals
Chamber stated in the affirmative that the inherent ability of a tribunal to determine its own
jurisdiction “is a necessary component in the exercise of the judicial function and does not need
to be expressly provided for in the constitutive documents of those tribunals.”20
Secondly, the Appeals Chamber determined whether it could examine the legality of its
establishment by the United Nations Security Council, or essentially examine the legality of an
act by its “creator.”21 While the Tribunal determined that it had not been “established for that
purpose,”22 it determined that it could exercise this “‘incidental’ jurisdiction . . . solely for the
purpose of ascertaining its own ‘primary’ jurisdiction over the case before it.”23

17

Id. at ¶ 6.

18

This memo will focus on only the first challenge brought by Tadic against the ICTY, that of the legitimacy of the
establishment of the Tribunal. The issues relating to primacy and subject matter jurisdiction are beyond the scope of
this memo. For more information on these two issues and the Tadic case, see Aaron K. Baltes, Prosecutor v. Tadic:
Legitimizing the Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 49 ME. L. REV.
577 (1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
19

Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, at ¶ 18 (meaning “jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction” or
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz” in German) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

20

Id.

21

Id. at ¶ 20.

22

Id.

23

Id.

6

Additionally, the Appeals Chamber rejected the argument that the question of legitimacy
was a “political question” or “non-justiciable” dispute.24 It stated,
[a]s long as the case before it or the request for an advisory opinion turns on a
legal question capable of a legal answer, the Court considers that it is duty-bound
to take jurisdiction over it, regardless of the political background or the other
political facets of the issue.25
The ICTY found that the jurisdictional challenges raised by the Defense were all legal questions
and therefore examinable by the Court.
Next, the Court turned to the Defense’s allegations that the establishment of the ICTY
was invalid under the United Nations [“UN”] Charter. The Appeals Chamber examined the
power of the Security Council to create an international criminal tribunal under Chapter VII and
determined that its establishment was included in appropriate “measures not involving the use of
force” delineated in Article 41 of the UN Charter. The Court thereby held that the ICTY had
been lawfully established under the UN Charter.26
Finally, the ICTY Appeals Chamber concluded its investigation into the legitimacy of the
establishment of the Tribunal by asking whether the ICTY had been “established by law.”27 The
Court recognized that for a tribunal to be “established by law” is “a general principle of law;”
however, it “impos[es] an international obligation which only applies to the administration of
criminal justice in a municipal setting.”28 Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber maintained that an

24

The political-question doctrine is “[t]he judicial principle that a court should refuse to decide an issue involving
the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or legislative branch of government.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004).
.
25
Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, at ¶ 24 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
26

See id. at ¶¶ 26-40.

27

Id. at ¶ 41.

28

Id. at ¶ 42.

7

international tribunal “ought to be rooted in the rule of law and offer all guarantees embodied in
the relevant international instruments. Then the court may be said to be ‘established by law.’”29
Furthermore, the ICTY Appeals Chamber continued in its investigation of the term
“established by law,” and determined that there are three possible interpretations of its meaning
which might apply to an international tribunal.30 First, it could mean that a court must be
established by a legislature. This would “ensure that the administration of justice is not a matter
of executive direction, but is regulated by laws made by the legislature.”31 While this would be
necessary for most municipal systems, the Appeals Chamber determined that the requirement of
being established by a legislature “does not apply to the international setting nor, more
specifically, to the setting of an international organization such as the United Nations.”32
Judicial, executive, and legislative bodies do not exist in the international context in the way they
do in a national setting; therefore, “the separation of powers element of the requirement that a
tribunal be ‘established by law’ finds no application in an international law setting.”33
Alternatively, the Appeals Chamber proposed that “established by law” could refer to the
establishment of a tribunal “by a body which, though not a Parliament, has a limited power to
take binding decisions,” such as the Security Council.34 The Appeals Chamber again articulated
that the Security Council has the power to create a tribunal as a measure combating a threat to
the peace under Chapter VII, and stated that an amendment to the Charter is not necessary for
29

Id.

30

Id. at ¶ 43.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at ¶ 44.

8

such a creation.35 The ICTY also mentioned the endorsement of an International Tribunal by the
General Assembly as a “representative” organ of the United Nations.36
Finally, the Appeals Chamber stated as a third possible interpretation of “established by
law,” and the “most sensible and most likely meaning of the term in the context of international
law,”37 is that “its establishment must be in accordance with the rule of law.”38 An international
tribunal “must be established in accordance with the proper international standards; it must
provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice, and even-handedness, in full conformity with
internationally recognized human rights instruments.”39 The Appeals Chamber pointed out that
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should be used as a guideline,
specifically, Article 14, which states as follows:
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination
of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. . .
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id. at ¶ 45.

38

Id.

39

Id.

9

(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him,
in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.40
“What is important,” the Appeals Chamber continues, “is that [a tribunal] be set up by a
competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal procedures, and . . . that it observes the
requirements of procedural fairness.”41 The provisions of the Article 14(3) are considered the
ICCPR’s fair trial guarantees. Because these fair trial guarantees were adopted in Article 21 of
the ICTY Statute, and other guarantees were included in the Statute and the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the Appeals Chamber determined that the ICTY had “all the necessary safeguards
of a fair trial” and dismissed the appeal on the grounds of unlawful establishment of the
International Tribunal.42
The ICTY and the Extraordinary Chambers are markedly different tribunals. Inherently
international in nature, the ICTY is an ad-hoc tribunal established by the Security Council
pursuant to its Chapter VII powers.43 The Extraordinary Chambers, on the other hand, is a

40

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), UN. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, [hereinafter ICCPR] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

41

Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, at ¶ 45 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].

42

Id. at ¶¶ 46-48.

43

See id. at ¶¶ 28-40.

10

hybrid tribunal founded within the existing structure of the Cambodian court system through an
agreement between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Nations,44 and
established by the Cambodian legislature.45 Nevertheless, it is possible to apply many of the
findings by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case to the structure of the ECCC. This
memo will explore the application of the relevant sections of the Tadic opinion as they apply to
the legitimacy of the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.

44

See ECCC Agreement, supra note 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

45

See ECCC Law, supra note 4 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. THE AUTHORITY OF THE ECCC TO EXAMINE ITS OWN
JURISDICTION.
1. La compétence de la compétence
Before it can determine the legality of its establishment, the ECCC must determine that it

has the authority and capability to examine the question of its own jurisdiction. The Defense
may, as did the defense in the Tadic case, argue for a narrow concept of jurisdiction,46 here
limited to the prosecution of the people “most responsible for the crimes and serious violations
of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international
conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975
to 6 January 1979.”47 Indeed, nowhere in the ECCC Law does it specifically state that the
Extraordinary Chambers has the power to examine its own establishment.
However, the “competence” of the Extraordinary Chambers defined in both Chapter I and
Chapter II of the ECCC Law48 is what the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY referred to as the
“original,” “primary,” or “substantive” jurisdiction of the tribunal.49 The ECCC Law does not,
by defining the original competence of the tribunal, preclude it from exercising “incidental” or
“inherent” jurisdiction “which derives automatically from the exercise of the judicial function.”50
The ECCC’s position as an Extraordinary Chambers, while integrated within the judicial system

46

Tadic Decision at Trial, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at ¶ 8 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

47

ECCC Law, supra note 4, art. 1 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

48

Id., arts. 1-8.

49

Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-95-1-AR72, at ¶ 14 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
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of Cambodia, demands that it fulfill its role as a tribunal and appropriately give a considered
examination of the legality of its own foundation.
The “jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,”51 more commonly known as la
compétence de la compétence in French or Kompetenz-Kompetenz in German, is “part, and
indeed a major part, of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitral
tribunal.”52 In fact, the ICTY Appeals Chamber goes so far as to state that the ability for a court
to determine its own jurisdiction “is a necessary component in the exercise of the judicial
function and does not need to be expressly provided for in the constitutive documents of those
tribunals.”53
However, the Extraordinary Chambers is something of an anomaly in the arena of
international law. Essentially, the ECCC results from a hybrid domestic and international
establishment. Unlike the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which was established solely by a
treaty between the United Nations and Sierra Leone,54 yet has been determined to be an
international tribunal completely separate from the judicial system of Sierra Leone,55 the ECCC
was set up with the intention that it would exist within the Cambodian judicial system, but would
be “extraordinary” in the sense that it would receive international assistance and incorporate
international elements. Therefore, the ECCC is at once operating both under international law
and under the justice system of Cambodia. The incorporation of those extraordinary
51
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55

Taylor Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I-059 (affirming that the SCSL “is not a
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international elements not common to the rest of the Cambodian courts mandates that the
Extraordinary Chambers go through the exercise of determining its own competence and legality
of its establishment.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber concedes that the power of la compétence de la compétence
can be limited “by an express provision in the arbitration agreement or in the constitutive
instruments of standing tribunals;”56 however, such an express provision cannot be found in the
ECCC Law57 or the ECCC Agreement.58 A broad reading of this omission would demonstrate
that the drafters of the ECCC, similar to those for the ICTY, viewed the exercise of la
compétence d la compétence as necessary to the independence of the Extraordinary Chambers.
In any event, even when reading the ECCC Law and ECCC Agreement narrowly, one cannot
infer “such a limitation . . . without an express provision allowing the waiver or shrinking of such
a well-entrenched principle of general international law.”59 Again, such an express provision
simply does not exist.
2. The Ability of the ECCC to Examine Its Establishing Body
Determining the ability of the Extraordinary Chambers to examine its own establishing
body raises the question of what body actually established the Extraordinary Chambers.
Although the ECCC is established in the existing court structure of Cambodia,60 its special
relationship as an extraordinary chamber tied to the United Nations cannot be overlooked. While
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the ECCC Law promulgated by the Cambodian legislature created and implemented the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Cambodian court structure, the Agreement between the United
Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia also applies to the ECCC.61 Specifically,
Article 2(2) of the ECCC Agreement states that Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties applies to the Agreement.62 Article 27 states, “A party may not invoke the provision
of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”63 As the ECCC Agreement
is a treaty between the Members of the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia,
governed by the Vienna Convention, it cannot be denied that both the United Nations and the
Royal Government of Cambodia “intended to establish a judicial body”64 where one did not
previously exist. The fact that this judicial body was established within the existing Cambodian
judicial structure does not take away the extraordinary nature of these Chambers, which was
intended by the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia from the beginning; that
is, they intended to create a tribunal where the Cambodians with international assistance could
bring the Khmer Rouge to justice.
Therefore, while the Extraordinary Chambers was established by the Cambodian
Legislature, the ECCC Agreement demonstrates that at its core, the ECCC plays a dual role, both
inherently Cambodian and explicitly international in nature. Cambodia and the UN have created
a new kind of hybrid tribunal that draws its legitimacy from two separate and distinct sources;
the ECCC is simultaneously both national and international.
61
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Just as the ICTY Appeals Chamber determined that it could examine the legality of its
establishment by the Security Council, in reference to the United Nations Charter,65 so must we
examine the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, but in a two-pronged fashion. First,
its establishment by the Cambodian legislature must be evaluated with reference to both the
Cambodian constitution and international standards of capacity. Secondly, its establishment via
international treaty must be explored to determine whether or not it retains characteristics of an
international organization set up by treaty.
3. Legitimacy: Not A Political or Non-Justiciable Question
Although the ICTY Trial Chamber found the issue of tribunal legitimacy to be a political
question, the Appeals Chamber reversed that finding.66 The ICTY Trial Chamber found that the
question of the legitimacy of the Security Council’s establishment of the ICTY rested on a factbased question of whether the events in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to the peace.67
The Trial Chamber cited the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Baker v. Carr in an
attempt to demonstrate that a question regarding the establishment of a tribunal was indeed a
political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-ordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due co-ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.68
65
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In essence, the Trial Chamber was trying to show that questioning the body which established it
was not actually a legal question, but rather an attempt to force the Tribunal to rule on a political
debate. If the question were really a legislative or executive issue in disguise, the Tribunal
should refuse to rule on it.
However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber completely disagreed with the Trial Chamber’s
analysis. It stated, “As long as the case before it or the request for an advisory opinion turns on a
legal question capable of a legal answer, the Court considers that it is duty-bound to take
jurisdiction over it.”69 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the theories of “political
questions” and “non-justiciable disputes” as antiquated ideas that have “receded from the horizon
of contemporary international law.”70 The Appeals Chamber thus found that the question of the
legality of the establishment of a tribunal is inherently a legal question, regardless of the political
issues that may come into play when examining the competence of a tribunal.
Ultimately, it must also be recognized that there is a policy interest in articulating the
competence of a new tribunal. International eyes will be on the Extraordinary Chambers to see
how it handles challenges against it, and meeting a challenge to its own establishment and
legitimacy with forceful legal arguments will set a much stronger tone of justice and fairness
than just dismissing the challenge as political or non-justiciable. To ignore a challenge that the
Extraordinary Chambers was not legally established is to brush the issue under the rug. The
challenge becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, undermining the legitimacy of the tribunal, unless
it is properly addressed and dismissed in court.
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B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ECCC
In the Tadic case, the challenge was made by the Defense that the ICTY was not
“established by law.”71 The Defense claimed that the establishment of a court by law is one of
the “general principle[s] of law recognized by civilized nations” referred to in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice as one of the sources of international law.72 The
Appeals Chamber examined the assertion that an individual is “entitle[d] . . . to have a criminal
charge against him determined by a tribunal which has been established by law.”73 To bolster
this argument, the Defense pointed toward the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human
Rights, all of which refer to a “fair and public hearing” by an “independent and impartial
tribunal.”74 While in dicta the Appeals Chamber makes it clear that the requirements articulated
in these conventions impose an “international obligation” on national criminal justice systems,
the Court stops short of demanding all these requirements from an international criminal
tribunal.75 However, the Appeals Chamber then appears to double back by stating that an
international criminal court “ought to be rooted in the rule of law and offer all guarantees
embodied in the relevant international instruments. Then the court may be said to be established
by law.”76 Moreover, the Extraordinary Chambers has a unique dual standing in the international
community. The ECCC is not only an international tribunal, but is also part of the national
71
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judicial system of Cambodia. Therefore, it is even more clear, according to the Tadic opinion,
that the Extraordinary Chambers must be “established by law” in order to be deemed a legally
founded legitimate tribunal.
Effectively, the Appeals Chamber requires that even an international tribunal be
“established by law” and continued by examining three possible meanings of that phrase: 1)
established by a legislature,77 2) established by a body “which, though not a Parliament, has a
limited power to take binding decisions,”78 and 3) established in accordance with the rule of
law.79 This section will discuss these three possibilities and how they apply to the Extraordinary
Chambers, as well as an additional possible meaning put forth by the Defense at trial, which is
that the “consensual act of nations” can constitute a tribunal duly established by law,80 the latter
interpretation is demonstrated more adequately by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
1. Establishment by a Legislature
The first possible meaning for “established by law” that the Appeals Chamber sets forth
in Tadic is the possibility that a tribunal could be established by a legislature.81 The theory
behind this meaning, supported by the European Court of Human Rights, is that the
establishment should not depend on the whim of the executive, but should evolve from
parliamentary law in a democratic society.82
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While the ICTY Appeals Chamber dismissed the notion of creating a tribunal by law
from a legislature in the international law setting, saying it found no application,83 as there is no
true international legislature, this notion does now apply in the case of the Cambodian
Extraordinary Chambers. The Cambodian legislature passed the Law on the Establishment of
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, which created the ECCC and
effectively serves as its statute.84
While it appears clear that the Extraordinary Chambers were established by the
Cambodian legislature, there is concern about the legitimacy of the Cambodian legislature itself;
that is, its degree of autonomy from the Cambodian executive. Violence and intimidation
dominates the political scene during elections, and members of parties not affiliated with the
ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) have had reasons to fear for their safety.85 The National
Election Committee (NEC), which oversees the electoral process, has a questionable amount of
independence.86 In 2005, the Prime Minister arrested and jailed many opposition
parliamentarians.87 However, there are indications that the legislature is more than just a rubber
stamp for the executive’s actions. In particular, the parliament passed several changes to the
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers before it passed it.

83

Id.

84

ECCC Law, supra note 4 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]. See also Gerald V. May, III,
Comment, An (Un)Likely Culprit: Examining the U.N.’s Counterproductive Role in the Negotiations over a Khmer
Rouge Tribunal, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 147 (2004) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
85

Human Rights Watch, The Run-Up to Cambodia’s 2003 National Assembly Election: Political Expression and
Freedom of Assembly under Assault, June 2003, at 1 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

86

Id.

87

Human Rights Watch, Country Summary: Cambodia, January 2006, at 1 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 41].

20

In the Tadic case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber also suggested that “established by law”
refer to an establishment by a non-Parliamentary organ that still nonetheless “has a limited power
to take binding decisions.”88 As applicable to the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber found that the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII was such a body.89 However, in the case of the
Extraordinary Chambers, its founding was done both through the creation of a law by an actual
legislature and by a treaty between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia.90
2. Establishment by a Treaty
In arguing that a resolution of the Security Council could not establish an ad-hoc tribunal,
at trial, Tadic raised the argument that the ICTY should have been created by treaty, the
consensual act of nations, or by amendment of the UN Charter.91 While these possibilities were
irrelevant in the Tadic case, an international tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was
later created by treaty.92 The SCSL is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations established
by the Security Council, or a national court established by law.93 It is a “treaty-based organ not
anchored in any existing system.”94 As a court established by an agreement between the United
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Nations and Sierra Leone, the Special Court viewed itself as “an expression of the will of the
international community,” and therefore an international, not domestic, court.95 The Special
Court also determined that because it was established by treaty, it “has the characteristics
associated with classical international organisations” and similar competence and jurisdiction to
the other international courts, the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC.96
Like the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia was also established by treaty, the Agreement between the United Nations and the
Royal Government of Cambodia.97 The Agreement provided that the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties98 governed the treaty, which meant that the parties were required to act in good
faith and respect the ECCC Agreement as the supreme law of the land. Cambodia was therefore
required to amend its law to bring it into compliance with the treaty, and could not claim that its
own domestic law required violation of the treaty.99
3. Establishment in Accordance with the Rule of Law
The interpretation of the phrase “established by law” that the ICTY Appeals Chamber
preferred is that a tribunal “must be established in accordance with the proper international
standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full
95
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conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments.”100 The Appeals Chamber
called this view of the phrase the “most sensible and most likely meaning of the term in the
context of international law,”101 and continued by stating that what is important in determining
the legality of a tribunal is “not whether it was pre-established or established for a specific
purpose or situation; what is important is that it be set up by a competent organ in keeping with
the relevant legal procedures, and should that it observes the requirements of procedural
fairness.”102 The procedural fairness referred to by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic is taken to
refer to the basic fair trial guarantees enumerated in Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.103 Additionally, the ICTY Appeals Chamber pointed out that the
Human Rights Committee views compliance with these fair trial guarantees as the standard by
which a “special” or “extraordinary” criminal court should be scrutinized.104
The Appeals Chamber then examined the Statute of the ICTY and its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence to determine whether the proper fair procedures had been afforded defendants by
the ICTY.105 In determining that the ICTY “provides all the necessary safeguards of a fair
trial”106 and “is thus ‘established by law,’”107 the court pointed out that the fair trial guarantees of
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Article 14 of the ICCPR have been adopted almost verbatim.108 Similarly, the Article 14
guarantees have also been adopted nearly verbatim in Article 35 of the ECCC Law.109
Moreover, Article 33 of the ECCC Law states that the Extraordinary Chambers “shall exercise
their jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness, and due process
of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.”110 A list of the Article 14 guarantees and an evaluation of how they are implemented in
the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers follows.
a. Minimum fair trial guarantees afforded by ICCPR Article 14.
The following chart sets the ICCPR fair trial guarantees up directly against their
implementation in the ECCC Law Article 35.
Table 1. Minimum Fair Trial Guarantees in the ICCPR and ECCC Law
ICCPR Article 14111
a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a
language which he understands of the nature
and cause of the charge against him;
b) To have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence and to communicate
with counsel of his own choosing;
c) To be tried without undue delay;
d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing; to be informed, if he does
not have legal assistance, of this right; and to
have legal assistance assigned to him, in any
case where the interests of justice so require,
and without payment by him in any such case

ECCC Law Article 35112
a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a
language that they understand of the nature and
cause of the charge against them;
b) to have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of their defence and to
communicate with counsel of their own
choosing;
c) to be tried without delay;
d) to be tried in their own presence and to
defend themselves in person or with the
assistance of counsel of their own choosing, to
be informed of this right and to have legal
assistance assigned to them free of charge if
they do not have sufficient means to pay for it;
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if he does not have sufficient means to pay for
it;
e) To examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter
if he cannot understand or speak the language
used in court;
g) Not to be compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt.

e) to examine evidence against them and obtain
the presentation and examination of evidence
on their behalf under the same conditions as
evidence against them;
f) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if
the accused cannot understand or does not
speak the language used in court;
g) not to be compelled to testify against
themselves or to confess guilt.

As the above table demonstrates,113 for the most part, there is a negligible difference between the
wording of the ICCPR provisions and the related provisions in the ECCC Law Article 35. The
one notable exception is in section e) of both documents. While the ICCPR mentions the
defendant’s right to examine witnesses against him, the ECCC Law mentions evidence instead.
It is likely that this reflects the reality of the civil law procedures which will be implemented in
the Extraordinary Chambers; in the civil law system, more emphasis is placed on the
examination of the evidence in the dossier prepared by the investigating judge than on the crossexamining of witnesses at trial as in the common law tradition.
b. Guarantees beyond the basic fair trial requirements.
i. Innocence presumed until proven guilty.
One example of a fair trial guarantee beyond the basic requirements of ICCPR Article 14
is the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilsty. The ECCC Law incorporates the
ICCPR’s stipulation that “[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be

113
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presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law”114 by changing the wording slightly. It
instead states, “The accused shall be presumed innocent as long as the court has not given its
definitive judgment.”115 The different wording does not appear to change the meaning of the
right in any substantial way, and can possibly be attributed to translation.
ii. Nullem crimen sine lege
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, or the theory that no punishment should be
imposed by a previous penal law, is fundamental in international criminal law. In the case of the
Extraordinary Chambers, it means that the crimes prosecuted before the ECCC must have been
crimes at the time they were committed, in 1975.116
Article 33 of the ECCC Law states that the Extraordinary Chambers “shall exercise their
jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law,
as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the [ICCPR].”117 Article 15 of the ICCPR states the following:
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person
for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations.118
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This article articulates the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The defense may try to apply
this principle to some of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers because
they were not crimes under Cambodian penal law119 at the time they were committed. However,
this argument will fail, for by incorporating Article 15 into the ECCC Law, the Extraordinary
Chambers has imported the Article 15 definition of what constituted a previous criminal
offense.120 This means that if the offense was criminal under international law, not just domestic
law, at the time it was committed, then it can be prosecuted at the Cambodian Extraordinary
Chambers.121
C. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS FACING THE ECCC
On paper, the Extraordinary Chambers provides nearly all of the due process elements
enumerated in the ICCPR. However, a culture of respect in Cambodia for these due process
concerns did not exist before the establishment of the ECCC.122 When questioning the
legitimacy of the Extraordinary Chambers, scholars have posited the question of whether or not
the Chambers will stand up for the rights enumerated in its founding documents, or if the culture
of corruption is so entrenched in the Cambodian judicial system that the ECCC will not be able
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to escape its hold.123 The Secretary-General of the United Nations himself voiced these
concerns, stating that he “found there to be little respect on the part of the Cambodian courts for
the most elementary features of the right to a fair trial.”124 Since the Extraordinary Chambers
rely so heavily on the existing Cambodian judicial system and contain a majority of Cambodian
judges, it remains to be seen whether or not the ECCC will be able to overcome the entrenched
obstacle to a fair trial and legitimate tribunal that is the Cambodian justice system.125
1. Competent, Independent, and Impartial Tribunal
One of the most serious concerns regarding the ability of the Extraordinary Chambers to
function as a legitimate institution regards the questionability of its independence and
impartiality from governmental and partisan influence. This independence and impartiality is
crucial to the legitimacy of the tribunal and is required by Article 14 of the ICCPR.126
Throughout the negotiation process between Cambodia and the United Nations, much concern
was voiced over the composition of the ECCC.127 One of the primary reasons that the United
Nations pushed for so long, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, for a majority of international
judges in the ECCC is that the UN had reservations about the independence of the Cambodian
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judiciary.128 Historically, the judicial system of Cambodia has been weak and corrupt.129 Most
of the judges have belonged to the government’s political party. Additionally, political figures,
members of the police force, and the Ministry of Justice are believed to exert much control and
influence over the Cambodian judicial system.130
The public has very little confidence in the Cambodian court system; in fact, a “culture of
impunity” has been allowed to dominate the judicial landscape.131 The belief is widespread that
the Cambodian People’s Party (CCP) often instructs judges how they should rule and prosecutors
what cases and charges they should bring.132 The threat goes beyond monetary issues; judges are
worried about threats to their safety if they do not rule as they are told, and there have been
assassinations.133
Further complicating the impartiality of the Extraordinary Chambers, Hun Sen, the
Cambodian Prime Minister, has been vocal in his demands on the ECCC.134 As a former Khmer
Rouge soldier himself, Hun Sen is not removed from the actions of the Extraordinary Chambers,
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nor is he necessarily immune from prosecution.135 He has stated publicly that lower ranking
members of the Khmer Rouge will not be subject to trial, and indeed, it was written into the
ECCC Law that the court would only try “those who were most responsible for the crimes and
serious violations,”136 effectively ensuring that Hun Sen will never be brought before the ECCC.
As he has been successful in dictating the affairs of the ECCC in the past, there is concern that
this could continue in the future.137
In an effort to enhance professional security, discourage susceptibility to bribes and
provide the judges with the ability to be as impartial and independent as possible, measures have
been taken to compensate the Cambodian judges of the Extraordinary Chambers considerably
more than their colleagues in other Cambodian courts.138 While they will still only be paid about
half the salary of their international counterparts, the salary will be much more than a typical
Cambodian judge would receive.139 It is assumed that this will alleviate some of the pressure on
the judiciary to take bribes. Unfortunately, this does not solve the problems of political and
physical pressure that also occur in the Cambodian justice system.
2. Conditions for the Arrest and Custody of Accused
If there is an element of the Cambodian justice system that has even a greater cloud of
suspicion upon it than the judiciary, it is the police. Police and soldiers have been allowed free
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reign in the country for years, and have essentially lived above the law.140 In fact, the police
have been considered the “biggest source of human rights violations in the country,”141
particularly in the context of pre-trial detention.142 This is particularly problematic for the
Extraordinary Chambers because Article 33 of the ECCC Law states that “[c]onditions for the
arrest and the custody of the accused shall conform to existing law in force.”143 If the police
force is committing human rights violations, and the investigation or interrogation processes are
corrupted, then a legitimate institution cannot allow evidence obtained into court. Moreover, if
the Extraordinary Chambers is forced to acquit some of Cambodia’s most notorious criminals
due to police violations and improper treatment of defendants, it will be viewed as powerless and
ineffectual.
In a related measure, the ECCC has yet to fully incorporate the international prohibition
of trials in absentia into its Draft Rules.144 Trials in absentia have occurred frequently in
Cambodia.145 Therefore, it is imperative that the right of a person to appear at his trial in order to
aid in his defense be explicitly stated in the Rules.146
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3. Equality of Arms
There appear to be a few issues regarding the equality of arms in the Extraordinary
Chambers. Specifically, an international co-prosecutor will be given the competence to appear
in the Extraordinary Chambers,147 but international lawyers acting as defense counsel who are
not members of the Cambodian bar will not be permitted to speak in court. It has been assumed
that since this is the case under traditional Cambodian law, international lawyers will be
permitted to act only in an advisory capacity.148 However, it appears that this matter is still
under debate and has yet to be resolved. The Draft Internal Rules show several propositions,
some of which would allow international defense lawyers to appear before the ECCC.149 The
first proposition involves international lawyers registering with the Bar Association of the
Kingdom of Cambodia, which would maintain a special list recognizing the right of those
lawyers to represent clients before the ECCC as co-lawyers.150 Alternatively, the Defence Unit
may maintain such a list.151 Most interestingly, however, the Draft Rules state that international
lawyers “shall work in conjuction with a lawyer admitted in Cambodia, as co-lawyers, with equal
rights of audience.”152 It appears that this Rule would satisfy equality of arms, because the
international prosecutor would be a co-prosecutor as well. These Rules, however, are just drafts,
and could change before the Extraordinary Chambers hold their first court session.
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Moreover, this particular Rule has been a sticking point for the Cambodian Bar
Association, which holds the position that international lawyers should not be allowed to
represent defendants in the Cambodian courtroom, only serve as advisors to Cambodian
counsel.153
4. Possibility of Procedural Gridlock: The Supermajority Requirement
The supermajority formula,154 which requires a majority of judges plus one for any
judicial decision to be made in the ECCC, even procedural decisions, evolved from a
compromise that theoretically would allow a majority of Cambodian judges while forcing the
international judges to be relevant. It requires that at least one of the international judges be in
the majority for any decision to be made; therefore, the Cambodian judges cannot ignore the
input of the international judges.155
The problem arises when a supermajority decision cannot be reached, for example, if the
bench were to split along international / national lines. It is unclear as to how the Extraordinary
Chambers would then proceed. It could result it an effective acquittal, because retrial before a
different chamber has no precedent in Cambodia.156 Alternatively, the decision could be left in
an “unsatisfactory limbo, where there is neither a conviction nor an acquittal,” similar to the
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Scottish verdict of “not proven.” 157 Again, this would result in the person being freed without a
decision. As a practical matter, this is problematic, because it would result in no answer after
considerable time and money has been spent in holding a trial.158 However, as demonstrated by
the Scottish model and the American “hung jury,” such a result is not without precedent.159
Particularly troublesome is the use of this supermajority formula for procedural decisions.
Even establishing when Cambodian law is in conflict with international law, and how
international law should be applied can become gridlock decisions. The ECCC Law states that if
the judges are unable to come to a supermajority decision, the trial shall continue. However, the
meaning of “continue” is ambiguous. In such a case, continue could mean to continue applying
Cambodian law until a supermajority decision was made. Rules must be put in place either by
the ECCC or by the judges themselves that international law will be the default option in such a
conflict. At the very least, a procedure must be articulated to solve this ambiguity.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
As a new kind of hybrid tribunal, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

draws on dual sources of national and international legitimacy. While this creates many
dichotomies and conflicts, it allows the tribunal a special opportunity to draw on international
lessons and precedent while integrating itself into the judicial system of Cambodia. The ECCC
must never lose sight of the extraordinary position in which it finds itself and the extraordinary
role which it must play. To lose sight of this position could cause the court to falter and become
bogged down in corruption and procedural quagmire. In order to maintain the legitimacy which
the United Nations and Cambodia have carefully laid out in its founding instruments, the ECCC
must successfully mesh international and Cambodian law into fair procedures which carry out
justice and ensure that the Extraordinary Chambers serve as an example which both the
Cambodian judiciary and international tribunals will want to emulate, not forget.
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